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THE EPISTEMIC CONNECTION BETWEEN 
KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE 
SCOTT D. PALMER 
Last year it was my privilege to address this 
conference on the subject of 'Foundationalism, 
Coherentism, and Epistemic Ultimates.' At that time I 
contended that foundationalism—the view that a 
necessary condition for the justification of any 
empirical proposition is that it rest, wholly or 
partly, on some epistemically ultimate 'self-
justifying' proposition(s)—could not be correct, 
because the epistemically ultimate propositions it 
requires are impossible. Through some relatively 
straightforward arguments, I attempted to show that 
such propositions (a) could not be justified themselves 
without some reliance on still prior propositions, and 
(b) could not be adequate in content to provide for the 
justification of the rest of our knowledge. 
I come before you today, hat in hand—not exactly 
to recant, but to admit that my foundationalist 
opponents had a better case than I was willing to give 
them credit for at the time. The key insight of 
foundationalism—an insight to which coherentists must 
pay homage—is that our judgments must somehow be 
connected with our sub-judgmental experience of the 
world. The fact that foundationalists have been unable 
to embody this insight in a defensible theory should 
not lead us to abandon the insight itself. 
One more preliminary comment is in order, and then 
we can get down to business. Coherentism, the view 
which I advocate in opposition to foundationalism, 
holds that propositions are justified by having a 
relation of logical coherence with a system of thought. 
A proposition p is coherent with a system S, somewhat 
loosely, if it does not conflict with any other 
proposition(s) of S or any deductive consequence of the 
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propositions) of S; and if it gives logical (not 
necessarily deductive) support to at least some of the 
other members of S, and receives logical (not 
necessarily deductive) support from at least some of 
the other members of S. Preliminaries now out of the 
way, let's move on to the main issue at hand. 
That there is some sort of raw experience, a 
'given' element which underlies our judgments, I have 
no doubt. Moreover, this given element constrians the 
system of judgments which we articulate. But how? How 
is it that when I feel a pain, I am 'justified' in 
recognizing it as a pain but not as a tickle? The 
mental sequence seems to go like this: 
[1] sub-judgmental experience: 'pain.' 
[21 elementary judgment of perception: 
recognition of the 'pain' as a pain. 
(3] explicit judgment: "I have a pain." 
Now of course in the adult mind this sequence is 
virtually instantaneous; but I think it captures the 
logical order of things. 
It's fairly clear that |3|, the.explicit judgment 
that "I have a pain," is justified at least in part on 
the basis of [2], the implicit judgment involved in 
recognizing the pain as a pain. But how can we justify 
our step from [1J to f2j? If we construe justification 
as a quasi-logical relation which can only obtain 
between judgments, then we simply cannot justify the 
step from (1| to [2]. But we must justify it somehow, 
or our knowledge will be completely severed from our 
experience. There will be no more reason for me, upon 
having a 'painful* experience, to judge that I am in 
pain than for me to judge that I am the King of Si am; 
and this is intolerable. 
This is the point that foundationalists and truth-
as-correspondence theorists have been trying to make: 
and 1 think they're right. Our knowledge must be tied 
to our experience somehow. But how? 
The most obvious way of attacking the problem is to 
revise our notion of the justification-relation. If we 
could allow elementary judgments of perception to be 
justified on the basis of sub-judgmental units of 'bare 
experience,• then our problem would be solved. On 
having a sub-judgmental experience of 'pain' (level 
|1|), we wouJd then be justified in making the 
perceptual judgment which consists of recognizing the 
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'pain' as pain (level [2]). We would have bridged the 
gap between our system of bare experiences and our 
system of judgments. This is the approach which, it 
seems to me, is unconsciously taken by many 
foundationalists. 
A typical foundationalist formulation involving 
this type of justification is given by Roderick 
Chisholm: 
If a person believes, without ground for 
doubt, that he is perceiving something to be 
F, then it is evident (justified) for him that 
he perceives something to be F. 
This sounds fine, and is even true, but it doesn't 
solve our problem. 'Perceiving something to be F' and 
'believing that one perceives something to be F' hardly 
qualify as bare experiences: they sound much more like 
perceptual judgments of levels {2] and |3]. And yet 
Chisholm has captured, as well as possible, the 
foundationalist approach to tying judgment to 
experience. The difficulty is that as soon as we bring 
the 'bare experience' of F-ness into the realm of 
language, it ceases to be bare; as soon as we tack the 
label 'F' onto an experience, it has been classified 
and brought within a system of judgments. What 
Chisholm seems to be telling us is that if we have 
arrived at level [2], the level of implicit perceptual 
judgment, then we are justified in moving on to level 
[3J and making out implicit judgment explicit. But we 
already knew how to get from [2] to |3J; what we needed 
was to get from [1] to (2]. 
I don't mean to pick on Chisholm—I probably 
couldn't do any better than he did with that kind of 
principle myself. But no principle of this type can 
ever do the job of connecting our judgments to our 
experience: it can only connect higher-level judgments 
to lower-level ones. There is no way to set up a 
justification-relation by which an ex hypothesi 
logically characterless bare experience could warrant 
or constrain a judgment in any way. We would always be 
left in the situation of making elementary judgment X 
because . . . Because what? As long as the right-hand 
term of the justification-relation is supposed to be a 
bare experience there can be no answer, because any 
answer we give will inevitably be a judgment. 
Now we come to the interesting part. If we cannot 
set up a direct justifying link between knowledge and 
experience, then we had better try to set up an 
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indirect link. Otherwise, all is lost and we are 
living in a dream world. 
I have on occasion shocked people at parties by 
saying that I thought Wittgenstein, in the latter part 
of his life, was a crypto-coherentist and incipient 
Absolute Idealist. I am even more convinced of this 
now. Some of his ideas give us a way out of our 
predicament. 
Wittgenstein said a lot of really strange things, 
but two of the strangest—and most important for our 
purposes—are the following: 
fi) that I cannot know that I am in pain. I 
can, however, know that other people are 
in pain. 
[ii] that initial indoctrination in a 
language-system is not education, but 
training. 
What I wish to maintain, taking my cue from these 
theses of Wittgenstein's, is that what links bare 
experiences to elementary 'judgments' of perception is 
not judgment, but association. I would suggest that 
elementary judgments of perception are judgments only 
in a special sense, which will be explored in what 
follows. 
Consider the way that we learn language in the 
first place. Our parents hold a red thing before us 
and say the word 'red;' this procedure is repeated over 
and over, and when we finally utter the sound 'red' 
upon being presented with a red thing, we are rewarded 
with a sweet. In this way a linguistic 'peg' is 
established. We do not know that a red thing is red, 
but we associate the quality redness with the 
linguistic peg. 
Before proceeding any further, it is necessary to 
give a brief account of what 'association' is to mean 
in this context. One might object to my thesis about 
linguistic pegs that a child would need to recognize 
the red thing for what it was before he could associate 
it with the sound 'red.1 Then, he would remember that 
in the past this particular color-quality had been 
presented at the same time as a particular sound, viz, 
'red.' So, it might be maintained, even by invocation 
of association and linguistic pegs does not really 
solve our problem of getting from level |1| to level 
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[2] after all, since it presupposes that we are already 
operating with level [2] implicit judgments. 
This objection can be met by distinguishing between 
ordinary memory and what I call quasi-memory is 
unconscious, automatic, and sub-judgmental. For 
example, when I am remembering a melody, I do not need 
to consciously think ahead and 'remember1 what the next 
note is supposed to be: my consciousness glides 
effortlessly and automatically from one note to the 
next. Association, as it applies to sense-qualities 
and linguistic pegs, is a form of quasi-memory. It is 
a relation which obtains between two contents of 
consciousness when the presence of one immediately 
elicits the idea (here meant in Hume's sense of a faint 
mental 'image' of the appropriate perceptual type) of 
the other. Thus, the association between a sense-
quality, e.g. red, and a sound-word, 'red,' need not 
depend on any prior judgments, implicit or otherwise. 
When the child is presented with a red object, his 
consciousness glides automatically—with no thought on 
his part—to the idea of the sound-word 'red.' 
Now, at the extremely low level of a child who has 
just learned the word 'red,' judgment is not yet 
present. The child does not know that a red thing is 
red; all he 'knows' is that saying the sound 'red' when 
presented with a red thing resulted in getting a sweet 
(and he 'knows' this only by quasi-memory). But as the 
child continues to experience and learn, his world 
becomes richer. He acquires linguistic pegs for more 
experiences, and begins to learn linguistic pegs for 
the relations between these experiences—e.g., that 
this 'red'-experience is 'behind' that •green'-
experience; or that a 'red'-associated experience never 
occurs at the same time and position in~his perceptual 
field as a 'green'-associated experience. And 
eventually, mirroring in his consciousness the 
structure which he finds in his experience, he realizes 
that a 'red'-experience is distinct from a •green'-
experience—i.e., he acquires rudimentary concepts of 
identity and difference—depending, as before, on 
quasi-memory. Further, at some point it dawns on him 
that the 'red'-experience is sometimes present, and 
sometimes not—thereby acquiring rudimentary concepts 
of presence and absence. 
It is within the context of the child's rudimentary 
concepts of identity and difference, presence and 
absence, that the essential form of judgment—that one 
thing is another—arises. The preceding account is, of 
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course, rather sketchy, but 1 think it captures the 
essence of what goes on. 
Let us now return more specifically to the question 
about our most elementary judgments of perception. 
What I wish to maintain is that in one respect they are 
judgments, but that in another respect they are mere 
associations. As the child's awareness of the world 
broadens, he arranges the mental representations of the 
sound-words he has learned into a formal structure 
isomorphic to that which he finds in his experience. 
This formal structure is a system of thought in embryo. 
With the advent of the formal mental representation 
of the structure of the child's experience, the sound-
word 'red' has come to be associated with two things. 
On the one hand, it is associated with the red-
experience. But on the other hand, it has now become 
associated with a place in a formal system of mental 
representations of sound-words. It is in this latter 
association that the elementary judgment of perception 
really becomes a judgment. 
As the formal structure becomes more and more 
completely articulated—with more words for qualities, 
spatial and temporal relations, etc.—there will be 
certain arrangements of words which are possible and 
certain arrangements which are not: these 
possibilities and impossibilities mirroring those found 
in the child's experience. Then, when the child 
associates the word 'red' with a red thing, the 
association will fit in harmoniously with the rest of 
his associations. For example, consider the following: 
Since in experience a red and a green cannot occupy the 
same position in a perceptual field at the same time, 
the second set of associations is in conflict, i.e., is 
incoherent. 
We now have, no longer a mere association of an 
experience with a sound-word, but an elementary 
judgment of perception. We have a mental unit which is 
association HI 
association \\2 
association 03 
•this-red' 
'this-same-that• 
•that-red' 
But consider another case 
association #1 
association U2 
association (13 
1this-red' 
'this-same-that' 
• that-green' 
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connected to 'bare experience' but which can also be 
tested for truth or falsity by virtue of its position 
in a formal system. And the test involved is 
coherence! 
Thus, we have done what we set out to do. We have 
provided a link between knowledge and experience such 
that elementary judgments of perception are justified, 
albeit not quite in the way we had expected. 
Unsolved problems: To really go through, the 
preceding account must be supplemented by more complete 
theories of memory and quasi-memory, the nature of 
judgment, and a more explicit account of just exactly 
how judgment arises out of a hodge-podge of quasi-
memory associations. These questions will provide the 
most interesting 3and challenging issues in the months and years to come. 
Indiana University 
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NOTES 
Of course, the more comprehensive the system, the 
more justification a proposition can derive from it. 
Also, the more lines of support going from the 
proposition to the system and vice versa, the more 
'coherent' the proposition is with the system and the 
more justification it receives. 
2 
Note that, with the advent of the formal system, 
it is no longer necessary to speak strictly of 'sound-
words'—the sound-words have become words by virtue of 
having a place in a formal system. 
3 
After I circulated a copy of this paper for 
comments, Mark Pastin pointed out that Wilfrid 
Sellars—in a 1954 paper, 'Some Reflections on Language 
Games'—had, um, shall we say, anticipated certain 
features of my theory. I have since then read the 
Sellars paper, find it highly illuminating, and 
recommend it to everyone with an interest in this 
issue. It is reprinted in Sellar's Science, Perception 
and Reality, pp. 321-58. 
